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The term "Arctic" is not only ecological but also mythical. The term refers to the areas which 
were thought to be located under the constellation 'Ursa Major' (the Great Bear).   
J. Pentikäinen, Shamanism and Culture, Helsinki 2006, p.120.  
 
 
If we shadows have offended, 
Think but this, and all is mended, 
That you have but slumber’d here 
While these visions did appear. 
And this weak and idle theme, 
No more yielding but a dream, 
Gentles, do not reprehend: 
if you pardon, we will mend (...). 
    William Shakespeare, A Midsummer-Night's Dream,  
Epilogue, Cambridge University Press 1924.  
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5. 
Legal Pluralisms 
 
Karol Dobrzeniecki 
 
Abstract 
“Legal pluralism” may denote various things in very various contexts. Its popularity in 
contemporary socio-legal debate sometimes additionally impedes the accurate understanding. 
 
1. Introduction 
An issue that requires careful consideration, always when writing about legal 
pluralism, is an adequate and conscious usage of the term58. “Legal pluralism” may denote  
various things in very various contexts. Its popularity in contemporary socio-legal debate 
sometimes  additionally impedes the accurate understanding. Different meanings are 
confused by polysemy. In my opinion legal pluralism cannot be confined solely to – as a 
popular definition says - “the idea that in any one geographical space, there is more than one 
law or legal system”59. Each plane of legal research (linguistic or analytical, psychological, 
sociological and axiological) offers a different view on legal pluralism.  Below I would like 
to sketch exemplary usages of the term.  
 
2. Exemplary usages of the term "legal pluralism" 
Analytical approach concentrates on the logical structure of law, the meanings 
and uses of its concepts, and the formal terms and the modes of its operation. Legal 
pluralism, from this perspective, was described by Nick Barber. In his view, a single legal 
system can contain multiple rules of recognition60 that leads to the system with unranked 
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legal sources. This kind of inconsistency cannot be resolved within the legal system because 
of the lack of legal mechanisms which could be used for such purpose. In analytical approach 
to legal pluralism, it is assumed that there is no higher constitutional body that can resolve 
such kind of  dispute through adjudication or legislation. “Consequently, pluralist legal 
systems contain a risk, which need not be realised, of constitutional crisis; of officials being 
compelled to choose between their loyalties to different public institutions.”61 For Barber, 
pluralist model of a legal system requires both multiple sources of law, and, also, the 
possibility of inconsistency between legal rules62. Systems with inconsistent rules of 
recognition existed not only as theoretical constructs. Pluralist legal orders in this sense 
occurred e.g. during Rhodesian crisis of 1965. The concept might also be applied for 
explanation of the relations between European and domestic legal orders. 
The founder and the most prominent representative of the legal psychologism was 
Leon Petrażycki (1867 – 1931). His concept consists in treating of all legal phenomena as a 
mere subclass of ethical ones63. The basis for the theory was a concept of emotion, especially 
ethical emotion regarded as an inward impediment to individual freedom. These 
psychological phenomena comprise both passive experiences (feelings) and a drive toward a 
certain action.  According to Petrażycki, if a man is facing the possibility of committing an  
ethically wrong act, it will evoke in him repulsive emotions that reject such an act. Ethical 
appulsions, on the contrary, usually cause proper behaviour, like paying debts or helping the 
poors etc.64 Experiencing ethical emotion is a condition for every ethical act.  Such 
observation leads Petrażycki to conclusion that, in fact, all ethical and legal phenomena are 
purely and exclusively individual phenomena and the consent and approval on the part of 
others, if any,   are irrelevant from the point of view of defining and studying their nature65. 
Ethical and moral phenomena differ in the aspect of reference to others. Obligations as to 
which nothing appertains are moral obligations. Ones which are felt as unfree with reference 
to others should be termed  legal obligations66.  
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Important for the discussed issue of legal pluralism is Petrażycki’s distinction 
between official and unofficial law. Official imperative-attributive phenomena are made up 
by what state officials actually experience in their capacity of public-legal authorities67. 
Unofficial law (e.g. system of norms governing the life of any family) does not possess this 
significance in the state68. From the theoretical point of view there are no essential 
differences between them. Positive law are rules referring to any kind of normative fact, 
which could be official (as statutes, administrative decisions), as well as unofficial (command 
of a leader) or may have only psychic nature. It refers to anything that is referred to by an 
agent as the source of the norm69. Petrażycki’s definition of law covers each imperative-
attributive phenomenon anywhere and anytime70. Capacity to experience such kind of 
feelings is not limited to humans, but covers also other kind of beings, even animals and 
plants.  
Legal pluralism moved to centre stage in socio-legal studies in the late 1980s. 
Many anthropologists and sociologists adopted the concept of law set forth by  John Griffiths, 
in the article “What is Legal Pluralism?” from 1986. He distinguished a nonuniformity of law 
(when more than one role is applicable to the same situation) from legal pluralism. The latter 
must be not normative but empirical, being an attribute of a social field, not of a legal system. 
Legal pluralism is a concomitant of social pluralism. “It is when  in a social field more than 
one source of ‘law”, more than one ‘legal order’, is observable, that the social order of that 
field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism.”71  Griffiths applies Sally Falk Moore’s concept of 
the ‘semi-autonomous social field’. He argues that law is present in every such field, and 
“since every society contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a universal feature of social 
organization.”72 He argues that there are many rule-generating fields in society, hence there 
are many legal orders in society, including the family, corporations, factories, sports leagues, 
and indeed just about any social area with social regulation 
Similar phenomena are taking place at the supranational level. As another 
sociologist, Günther Teubner noticed: wherever autonomous social sectors develop, at the 
same time autonomous law is produced, in relative distance from politics. World society is 
coming about not under the leadership of international politics, nor can it be equated with 
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72 Ibidem. 
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economic globalisation. “Instead, globalisation is a polycentric process in which 
simultaneously differing areas of life break through their regional bounds and each 
constitutes autonomous global sectors for themselves.”73 Law-making takes place outside the 
classical sources of international law, e.g. in agreements between global players, in private 
market regulation by multinational concerns, internal regulations of international 
organisations, interorganisational negotiating systems, world-wide standardisation processes, 
etc.74 
 
3. Iusnaturalism 
An example of a legal research on axiological plane is iusnaturalism. In this 
context legal pluralism might be understood  as co-existence of different kinds of law, not in 
psychological or sociological but in metaphysical sense.  Aquinas recognized four main kinds 
of law: the eternal, the natural, the human, and the divine. The eternal law is “the type of  
divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements”. The natural law is eternal law as it 
applies to people; it is “promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into men's minds so 
as to be known by them naturally". The divine law is the revealed word of God. The human 
law is created by men and its aim (telos), according to Aquinas, is the common good. The 
human law is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of 
the community.”75 Aquinas’s definition of law requires that there should be an authority in 
political communities, translating certain principles of natural law into positive law and 
reinforcing these principles with legal sanctions. Justified authorities derive the positive  law 
they make from the natural law or, equivalently, translate natural law principles of justice and 
political morality into the rules of positive law76.  
Positive law may be derived from the natural law in two ways. First, as a 
conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. Some 
things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of 
conclusions. For example, that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the 
principle that "one should do harm to no man". But some are derived there from by way of 
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determination. For example, the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished. 
But that he be punished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature77. Those 
things, which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong 
to the civil law, as each state decides on what is best for itself78. Accordingly, both modes of 
derivation are found in the human law. Those things, which are derived in the first way, are 
contained in human law not as emanating from that place exclusively, but have some force 
from the natural law also. Aquinas says that laws whose derivation from natural law is of this 
second type have their force 'from human law alone' (ex sola lege humana vigorem habent)79. 
Iusnaturalism is considered as having double or triple character.  Besides positive 
and natural laws, L. L. Vallauri distinguished also “free law”80. Because of this fact, 
iusnaturalism is often considered as “ontological pluralism of law”81.  
 
 4. Conclusion  
Legal pluralists reject narrow-minded perspective of traditional, positivistic and state-centred 
legal theory. They look for a different paradigm, which would recognize the plurality of law. 
The attitude should be praised as long as the pluralistic approach is used consciously and 
precisely, in order to explain legal issues at this research plane in which legal discourse is 
conducted. 
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